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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred Bv Finding The Officer's Conduct In Detaining Ashworth 
Constitutionallv Unreasonable 
A. Introduction 
Police officers, with information from two citizens that Ashworth was highly 
inebriated and information from one citizen confirmed by other information that 
he had been driving, entered an Alcoholics Anonymous (hereinafter "AA) 
meeting held in a community center to detain Ashworth. (R., pp. 5, 55-56; Tr., p. 
10, L. 8 - p. 18, L. 25; p. 22, L. 25 - p. 28, L. 18.) The district court found that 
Ashworth enjoyed a privacy expectation such that it violated the Fourth 
Amendment for the officers to pursue him into the AA meeting absent a warrant 
or an applicable warrant exception. (R., pp. 59-60.) The district court also 
determined that there were no exigent circumstances because lack of personal 
observation of intoxication prevented a finding of probable cause. (R., pp. 60- 
62.) The state has challenged both of these determinations. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 5-1 1 .) 
In response, Ashworth argues that he proved he had a subjective 
expectation of privacy because the name of the group holding the meeting was 
Alcoholics Anonvmous, the meeting was "held behind closed doors," and the 
district court was probably aware of information appellate counsel found on the 
internet. (Respondent's brief, pp. 10-13.) Ashworth does not argue that the 
district court's determination that there was no probable cause was correct, but 
instead argues that existing precedent regarding what constitutes an exigency 
should be overruled. (Respondent's brief, pp. 14-26.) Ashworth's arguments 
lack merit. Review of the record and application of the correct legal standards to 
the record show that Ashworth presented no evidence of a subjective 
expectation of privacy and that the facts do not establish that any subjective 
expectation of privacy was what society would consider reasonable. Likewise, 
Ashworth's arguments that dissipation of BAC evidence for a DUI does not 
create an exigency are contrary to the precedents of the ldaho appellate courts 
and the Supreme Court of the United States. 
B. The District Court Erred In Findinq Anv Privacy Interests Protected Bv The 
Fourth Amendment 
An expectation of privacy does not give rise to the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment unless the following criteria are met: (1) the defendant 
manifests a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched or seized, and 
(2) society is willing to accept the defendant's expectation of privacy as 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Smith v. Marvland, 442 U.S. 
735, 740 (1979); State v. Wilkins, 125 ldaho 215, 222, 868 P.2d 1231, 1238 
(1994). The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal 
assertedly "private" activity but whether the government's intrusion infringes upon 
the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984). The defendant has the threshold 
burden of demonstrating that his legitimate privacy interests were infringed by 
the challenged governmental action. Rawlinas v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 
(1 980); State v. Holland, 135 ldaho 159, 162, 15 P.3d 1167, ? 170 (2000). 
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Thus, a police officer's observations made from a 
location open to the public do not constitute a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, because the Fourth Amendment protects only reasonable 
expectations of privacy and one can have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in what is knowingly exposed to public view. State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 
143, 146-47, 953 P.2d 583, 586-87 (1998). 
In this case Ashworth presented no evidence to establish either prong of 
the privacy test. He presented no evidence that he had a subjective expectation 
that the AA meeting was not open to the public. If any private citizen could have 
walked into and joined that meeting, then society would not recognize an 
expectation that the meeting was private as reasonable. Because the evidence, 
if anything, established that the AA meeting was open to the public,' Ashworth 
failed to establish that entry into that room where the meeting was being held 
intruded on grounds protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Ashworth argues that the very nature of the AA meeting conveyed a 
reasonable expectation that what was said at the meeting would be held 
confidential, and therefore he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 10-14.) Even assuming the truth of the factual 
underpinnings of this argument, it is irrelevant. Because Ashworth had no 
' The district court apparently so found. (R., p. 59 ("the meeting occurred in a 
place open to the public").) 
3 
reasonable expectation that the public was denied access to that room and that 
meeting, he had no reasonable expectation that he was not in a "public place" 
where an arrest or investigative detention could not take place. See State v. 
Coma, 133 ldaho 29, 981 P.2d 754 (Ct. App. 1999) (arrest can be made in 
"public place"); State v. Wren, 115 ldaho 618, 768 P.2d 1351 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(~ame) .~  The district court's determination that "participants [in an AA meeting] 
are free from prosecution and recrimination arising from their participation" (R., p. 
59) is factually erroneous and legally irrelevant. Officers did not violate 
Ashworth's privacy by walking into the meeting because any other member of the 
public could have done so. 
C. Dissipation Of BAC Evidence Created An Exiaency 
Even if the Fourth Amendment applied to the officers' actions those 
actions were constitutionally reasonable. Probable cause to believe that 
Ashworth had been driving under the influence immediately prior to entering the 
AA meeting created an exigent circumstance due to the destruction of evidence 
of his BAC by the body's natural processes of eliminating alcohol from the 
system. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); State v. Robinson, 144 
ldaho 496, 163 P.3d 1208 (Ct. App. 2007). Because the officers had probable 
cause to believe that Ashworth had driven drunk immediately prior to the AA 
The state relies on its opening brief for its argument that the district court 
applied an incorrect legal standard when it required the state to prove that 
Ashworth did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 4-6.) 
meeting, their actions in entering and detaining Ashworth for investigation was 
constitutionally justified. 
Ashworth does not actively contend that the officers lacked probable 
cause. Instead, he argues as an alternative basis for the district court's ruling 
that the state should be required to establish exactly how long it would have 
taken to secure a warrant and that precedent finding dissipation of BAC 
evidence in DUI cases should be overruled. (Respondent's brief, pp. 14-26.) 
These arguments lack merit. 
1. The Evidence Established An Exigency 
Ashworth argues that there was no exigency because "it may very well be 
that the officers in this case could have secured a warrant within a matter of just 
a few minutes." (Respondent's brief, p. 17.) Review of the record and 
application of the correct legal standards shows that Ashworth's contention is 
without merit. 
The evidence in this case establishes that the officers contacted Ashworth 
at about 8:00 p.m. on May 5, 2008, in Weippe, Clearwater County, Idaho. (Tr., 
p. 5, Ls. 3-10; p. 11, L. 3 - p. 16, L. 3.) The law provides that a search warrant 
must be in writing. I.C. 33 19-4401, 19-4407. The person seeking the warrant 
must submit an affidavit of probable cause. I.C. 3 19-4403. The warrant itself 
must be issued by a judge, usually a magistrate. I.C. $3 19-4401, 19-4406. 
Clearwater county has a single magistrate, in Orofino. (DeskBook Directory 
Idaho State Bar 2009-2010, p. 184.) If the warrant is obtained by telephone, the 
proceedings must be recorded and transcribed, and a duplicate original warrant 
must be prepared. I.C. § 19-4404. 
Ashworth's speculation that a search warrant meeting these legal 
qualifications could ever be obtained in ''just a few minutes" is on its face 
unreasonable. That officers could have done so in rural Clearwater County at 
8:00 in the evening in that amount of time is preposterous. The officers would 
have had to draft an affidavit and a search warrant and print it, find a magistrate 
in another town after business hours, deliver the documents to the magistrate 
and get the warrant issued (or arrange for recording of a telephonic warrant 
application), return to Weippe and serve the warrant. It would have been 
impossible to do this in an amount of time that would not result in substantial loss 
of evidence. Given that a test resulting in a BAC of less than 0.08 would have 
been an absolute bar to prosecution, I.C. 3 18-8004(2), any reduction in the BAC 
was of potentially enormous significance. 
There is no question here but that evidence was being destroyed by 
Ashworth's normal bodily processes. The evidence also demonstrates that the 
time was in the evening in rural Clearwater County. The very process the 
officers would have had to undertake to secure a warrant under these 
circumstances shows that obtaining a warrant would have put the state's ability 
to gather the relevant and necessary evidence at risk. State v. Woolery, 116 
ldaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Worthinston, 138 ldaho 
470, 472, 65 P.3d 211, 213 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Coo~er, 136 Idaho 697, 
701, 39 P.3d 637, 641 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Curtis, 106 ldaho 483, 489, 680 
P.2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. App. 1984). The circumstances were exigent, and 
Ashworth's base speculation fails to show otherwise. 
2. Ashworth's Request To Overturn Established Precedent Should Be 
Reiected 
ldaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of 
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or 
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and 
remedy continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 ldaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 
(2002); State v. Humphews, 134 ldaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) 
(quoting Houahland Farms. Inc. v. Johnson, 119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 
983 (1990)); see also State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 981, 1001,842 P.2d 660,680 
(1992) ("[Plrior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly 
wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaqa, 125 
ldaho 384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this 
question, and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the 
issue, [the court must be] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the 
law as expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 ldaho 425, 440- 
52, 825 P.2d 1081, 1096-1 108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring). This 
Court should therefore follow the precedent of State v. Fees, 140 ldaho 81, 90 
P.3d 306 (2004), and State v. Robinson, 144 ldaho 496, 163 P.3d 1208 (Ct. App. 
2007), holding that the exigent circumstances exception applies to home entries 
if the underlying offense is jailable, and not just violent or a felony.' 
Ashworth argues that Fees and Robinson were wrongly decided, and that 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)' requires a "totality of the 
circumstances" test that will rarely justify a home entry for misdemeanors under 
the exigent circumstances exception. (Respondent's brief, pp. 18-26.) Fees and 
Robinson, however, distinguish Welsh for the same reasons the Supreme Court 
of the United States distinguished Welsh in Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 
334-36 (2001). m, 140 ldaho at 86-88, 90 P.3d at 311-13; Robinson, 144 
ldaho at 500-01, 163 P.3d at 1212-13. Ashworth instead requests this Court to 
rely on Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (gth Cir., 2009), an opinion that does 
not even admit the existence of the McArthur decision by the Supreme Court. 
The Idaho courts follow the "vast majority of jurisdictions rejecting the bright line 
felony rule." Robinson, 144 ldaho at 500-501, 163 P.3d at 1212-13. Ashworth 
has failed to show that this Court should overrule established precedent that 
interprets Supreme Court precedent the same way the Supreme Court does. 
The state notes that the exigent circumstances exception here at issue has 
long justified a search and seizure in the form of a blood draw. State v. Woolery, 
116 ldaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Worthinclton, 138 
ldaho 470, 472, 65 P.3d 211, 213 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Cooper, 136 ldaho 
697, 701, 39 P.3d 637, 641 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Curtis, 106 ldaho 483,489, 
680 P.2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. App. 1984). The issue addressed in Fees and 
Robinson was whether such an exception justified a home entry. The state 
notes that the police did not enter Ashworth's home, making Ashworth's 
argument that these cases should be overruled even less relevant. 
The officers in this case had probable cause to believe that Ashworth had 
very recently committed a DUI and that he was currently in an AA meeting in a 
public building where his body was naturally metabolizing the alcohol in his 
blood. This created an exigency that justified entry to order Ashworth to step out 
of the meeting and undergo evidentiary testing to establish his being under the 
influence and his BAC level. The district court erred to hold otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order suppressing evidence and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 5'h day of October, 2009. 
v p u t y  Attorney General 
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